Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

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Volume 162, issue C, 2016

Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing pp. 1-20

Herve Moulin

Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games pp. 21-54

Zibo Xu

Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard pp. 55-92

Hector Chade and Natalia Kovrijnykh

Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games pp. 93-113

Carl Veller and Laura K. Hayward

Geographical structure and convergence: A note on geometry in spatial growth models pp. 114-136

Giorgio Fabbri

A life-cycle model with ambiguous survival beliefs pp. 137-180

Max Groneck, Alexander Ludwig and Alexander Zimper

Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games pp. 181-194

Wei He and Nicholas C. Yannelis

A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games pp. 195-208

Michael Mäs and Heinrich H. Nax

Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining pp. 209-236

Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros

Universal interactive preferences pp. 237-260

Jayant Ganguli, Aviad Heifetz and Byung Soo Lee

How to share it out: The value of information in teams pp. 261-304

Alex Gershkov, Jianpei Li and Paul Schweinzer

Goals and bracketing under mental accounting pp. 305-351

Alexander Koch and Julia Nafziger

Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules pp. 352-371

Franz Dietrich, Christian List and Richard Bradley

A simple model of two-stage choice pp. 372-406

Sean Horan

Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality pp. 407-450

Christoph Müller

Volume 161, issue C, 2016

Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach pp. 1-36

Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg and Lorens A. Imhof

Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies pp. 37-75

Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador

Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes pp. 76-102

Dimitrios Xefteris

Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game pp. 103-144

Tai-Wei Hu and Neil Wallace

Search for an object with two attributes pp. 145-160

Wojciech Olszewski and Asher Wolinsky

In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting pp. 161-189

Julián García and Matthijs van Veelen

Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines pp. 190-222

Konrad Mierendorff

Volume 160, issue C, 2015

Limits to rational learning pp. 1-23

Yehuda Levy

Consistency and communication in committees pp. 24-35

Inga Deimen, Felix Ketelaar and Mark T. Le Quement

Priority classes and weighted constrained equal awards rules for the claims problem pp. 36-55

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty pp. 56-71

Mira Frick and Assaf Romm

Cooperation, punishment and immigration pp. 72-101

Paolo Pin and Brian W. Rogers

Expert advice to a voting body pp. 102-113

Keith E. Schnakenberg

Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences pp. 114-131

Juan Carlos Carbajal and Rudolf Müller

Communication with endogenous information acquisition pp. 132-149

Harry Pei

A model of regret, investor behavior, and market turbulence pp. 150-174

Jie Qin

Dynamically consistent voting rules pp. 175-187

Madhav Chandrasekher

Equilibrium price dispersion with sequential search pp. 188-215

Guido Menzio and Nicholas Trachter

A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search pp. 216-242

Qinggong Wu

Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems pp. 243-279

Jin Yong Jung and Son Ku Kim

Robust dynamic implementation pp. 280-316

Antonio Penta

Common value experimentation pp. 317-339

Jan Eeckhout and Xi Weng

Worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection pp. 340-386

Carlos Carrillo-Tudela and Leo Kaas

Information acquisition in global games of regime change pp. 387-428

Michal Szkup and Isabel Trevino

A more general Pandora rule? pp. 429-437

Wojciech Olszewski and Richard Weber

Complete and incomplete financial markets in multi-good economies pp. 438-462

Paul Ehling and Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen

Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others pp. 463-493

Franz Dietrich

Loss aversion, survival and asset prices pp. 494-516

David Easley and Liyan Yang

The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group pp. 517-535

Paul Grout, Sebastien Mitraille and Silvia Sonderegger

Mean-variance utility pp. 536-556

Yutaka Nakamura

Volume 159, issue PB, 2015

Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design pp. 679-701

Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Pavan

Optimal stopping with private information pp. 702-727

Thomas Kruse and Philipp Strack

Revenue management by sequential screening pp. 728-774

Mustafa Akan, Barış Ata and James Dana

Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach pp. 775-818

Daniel Garrett and Alessandro Pavan

Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach pp. 819-853

Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack

Optimal auction design under non-commitment pp. 854-890

Vasiliki Skreta

Dynamic screening with limited commitment pp. 891-928

Rahul Deb and Maher Said

A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment pp. 929-988

Jianjun Miao and Yuzhe Zhang

A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model pp. 989-1015

Noah Williams

On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models pp. 1016-1055

Bruno Strulovici and Martin Szydlowski

An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly pp. 1056-1073

Katalin Bognar, Tilman Börgers and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

Sequential information disclosure in auctions pp. 1074-1095

Dirk Bergemann and Achim Wambach

Volume 159, issue PA, 2015

Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian pp. 1-14

Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal and Simone Tonin

Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms pp. 15-65

Frank Rosar

Comment on “Imitation processes with small mutations” [J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 251–262] pp. 66-69

Alex McAvoy

Bayesian repeated games and reputation pp. 70-104

Antoine Salomon and Francoise Forges

Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default pp. 105-119

Gaetano Antinolfi and Francesco Carli

Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection pp. 120-136

Ryota Iijima

Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources pp. 137-162

Albin Erlanson and Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence pp. 163-208

Kiryl Khalmetski, Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner

A theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium pp. 209-220

Martin Byford

Randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity-averse preferences pp. 221-235

Sophie Bade

Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope pp. 236-266

Pär Holmberg and Bert Willems

Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation pp. 267-279

Takuro Yamashita

Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability pp. 280-289

Christoph Wagner, Tymofiy Mylovanov and Thomas Tröger

A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result pp. 290-310

Axel Anderson

Efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies with time-dependent preferences pp. 311-325

Pawel Dziewulski

Theory of decisions by intra-dimensional comparisons pp. 326-338

Gerelt Tserenjigmid

Optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous money holdings pp. 339-368

Francesco Lippi, Stefania Ragni and Nicholas Trachter

On the persistence of strategic sophistication pp. 369-400

Sotiris Georganas, Paul J. Healy and Roberto Weber

Approximate implementation in Markovian environments pp. 401-442

Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala

The logic of backward induction pp. 443-464

Itai Arieli and Robert Aumann

Hurwicz expected utility and subjective sources pp. 465-488

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

The wealth distribution in Bewley economies with capital income risk pp. 489-515

Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin and Shenghao Zhu

Skill, complexity, and strategic interaction pp. 516-530

Val Lambson and John van den Berghe

Strategic experimentation with private payoffs pp. 531-551

Paul Heidhues, Sven Rady and Philipp Strack

Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result pp. 552-573

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Price distortions under coarse reasoning with frequent trade pp. 574-595

Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart

Inertia in social learning from a summary statistic pp. 596-626

Nathan Larson

Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts pp. 627-655

Christian Kellner

Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty pp. 656-677

Marion Oury